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As network bandwidth increases, distributed applications are becoming increasingly 
prevalent. Systems using these applications are very complicated to build and must be 
dependable. Software agents are ideal for breaking complicated problems into manageable 
subtasks. Agent conversations, a series of messages passed between agents, are the cornerstone 
of multi-agent systems and must be deemed correct before being placed into service. The 
purpose of this research was to develop a formal methodology and technique to verify that the 
communication protocols defined in a multi-agent environment were valid. This was 
accomplished by examining agent conversations before deploying the system. An additional goal 
of this research was to develop a proof-of-concept module for agentTool that automatically 
verified some of the important properties identified in this methodology. 
AFTT/GCS/ENG/OOM-12 
A FORMAL METHODOLOGY AND TECHNIQUE 
FOR VERIFYING CONVERSATIONS 
IN A CLOSED MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM 
/. Introduction 
As network bandwidth increases, the Air Force is fielding increasingly distributed C3I 
applications. This is clearly delineated by visionary documents such as Joint Vision 2010 
(Shalikashvili, 1999), and Air Force 2025 (Kelley, 1996). The common thread in each of these 
documents is information superiority, which the Air Force believes will be the key factor to 
success in the 21st century. Distributed systems such as those required by the Air Force are very 
complicated to build, but must be dependable if the warfighters whose lives are at risk are going 
to trust them. Therefore, software engineers must ensure that the system and its information 
sources are robust, reliable, and secure. The Air Force's Office of Scientific Research is 
sponsoring research in intelligent software agents because they believe software agents are the 
appropriate mechanism for delivering these capabilities to the user. Distributed agents are well 
suited to applications that retrieve, filter, and summarize information as well as provide 
intelligent user interfaces and planning. The size and complexity of such a worldwide-distributed 
system will necessitate formal and rigorous approaches to ensuring the entire system will be 
interoperable and secure. 
Before a multi-agent system can be trusted to perform as expected, the communication 
methods between the agents must be formally verified. The verification process includes 
checking for infinite loops, deadlocks, and other communication pitfalls that would prevent a 
AFIT/GCS/ENG/00M-12 
multi-agent system from completing its mission. This thesis designs and implements a 
methodology using formal methods that verifies that a system of agents will communicate as 
expected before a user deploys the system. Then, and only then, the user of the multi-agent 
system can be assured the system will communicate as expected. 
1.1 Background 
Many agent-based systems consist mainly of single agents. These agents do not have the 
capability to cooperate with other agents and jointly solve a problem. However, advances in 
technology and programming languages have enabled software engineers to create systems of 
multiple agents that "team up" to solve tough problems. It is apparent that agents in multi-agent 
systems have to communicate in a distributed environment and pool resources to solve problems. 
The best way for software developers to tackle complex, large, or unpredictable domains 
is by breaking the problem into smaller, manageable tasks. Software agents can be used to solve 
these small tasks while working together to solve larger problems. Katia Sycara has observed 
that often agents must operate concurrently in a distributed environment to accomplish difficult 
tasks (Sycara, 1998). 
1.2 agentTool 
Agents communicate with each other using patterns of messages called conversations. 
Conversations may be structured and predictable, or they may be unstructured and dynamic. 
Structured conversations can be modeled using state transition diagrams. Given a set of 
conversation state transition diagrams, communication between agents can be simulated and all 
possible message combinations exercised. Using this approach, conversations are deemed valid if 
the desired message sequence takes place between the communicating agents. This process of 
deeming the  conversations  valid  or invalid  is  called  verifying  the  agent  conversations. 
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Conversations can be verified manually (by a human analyst) or automatically (by intelligent 
software and automated tools). 
The software development environment, agentTool, is being created at the Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AFIT) to address the need for a user friendly, robust tool for building 
multi-agent systems. The tool is designed to be an integrated environment that allows a user to 
graphically engineer a multi-agent system, verify the agent conversations with an automated 
verification tool, and automatically generate the source code for the designed system. This allows 
a user to specify a multi-agent system at three levels: domain, agent, and component. The 
domain level is where agent classes and interactions are defined. The agent level is where the 
internal agent architecture is defined. Lastly, the component level is where individual 
components in the system architecture are defined. During the domain level design, the 
communications between agents are specified as conversations. The system uses an automated 
verification tool and formal modeling languages to verify these conversations are valid. 
Feedback is provided to the user indicating whether the conversation design is valid. The 
automatic verification of agent conversations and message sequences using formal methods is the 
focus of this research effort. 
The agentTool system incorporates the latest technology in multi-agent systems. A 
designer uses pre-defined or user-defined components while building an agent system and 
implements the system on various frameworks (Robinson, 2000). Users build agent systems with 
graphical analysis and design tools that are easy and intuitive to use (Wood, 2000). A knowledge 
base preserves agent designs and components providing agentTool with reusability, robustness, 
and extensibility (Rafael, 2000). 
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1.3 Problem Statement 
Infinite loops, deadlocks, and other communication pitfalls can wreak havoc in a multi- 
agent system. Even worse, the system can appear to be working while an undetected catastrophic 
problem exists. The challenge is to explore paths that the conversation can feasibly encounter 
and formally verify the conversation is valid. Once the conversations have been verified, the user 
can trust the agents to communicate as expected. 
Researchers at AFTT are currently developing agentTool. To ensure security and 
interoperability, agentTool must be able to enforce protocol policy on a proposed system. 
Therefore, the goal of this research is to develop a formal methodology and technique to verify 
that the communication protocols defined in a multi-agent environment are valid. This is 
accomplished by examining agent conversations before deploying the system. An additional goal 
of this research is to develop a proof-of-concept module for agentTool that automatically verifies 
some of the important properties identified in this methodology. 
1.4 Assumptions 
The following are assumptions concerning agentTool, designed agents, and their 
operating environment. 
1) Agents designed in agentTool will be used in a closed environment. A closed 
environment is one in which all participants are known and all conversations are 
predetermined. An agent's behavior is predictable and agents communicate with 
each other via conversations. 
2) Agents can assume more than one role at a time, and can be involved in multiple 
conversations at any given time. 
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3) Conversations can be started from within other conversations. 
4) System variables can impact conversations in adverse ways. It is possible for an 
external factor to prevent a conversation from completing, even though the 
conversation is perfectly valid and has been verified. Therefore, it is assumed 
agentTool will not be able to detect errors caused by system variables while verifying 
conversations. 
1.5 Thesis Overview 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature and research including formal 
languages, automated verification tools, and the types of agent conversation properties that can be 
verified. Chapter 3 specifies a methodology that takes a conversation specification and verifies it 
using an automated tool. Chapter 4 describes the application of the verification methodology and 




This chapter reviews verifiable properties of agent conversations, and some of the 
languages and tools available for verifying properties of agent conversations. Section 2.2 
explains how agents use conversations and how to model them. Why formal methods are needed 
to verify conversations is covered in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 describes properties of agents that 
are verifiable while providing simple examples of such properties. Finally, Section 2.5 presents 
three formal languages and corresponding automated verification tools for verifying agent 
conversations. 
2.2 Multi-agent Systems and Agent Conversations 
Agents in a multi-agent environment should communicate with each other with structured 
messages. This enables the users of the multi-agent system to have assurance agents will perform 
as designed without unpredictably performing some unassigned task autonomously. The 
structured sequence of messages is called an agent conversation. Granted, there are occasions 
when agents are used in open environments where they may encounter any type of agent. In an 
open environment, an agent must be able to dynamically construct its conversations. However, 
this research is concerned with closed environments where agents are aware of their surroundings 
and know who their fellow agents are. Perhaps most importantly, each agent knows how it is 
supposed to communicate with its fellow agents. Whenever an agent sends or receives a 
message, it passes through various states of a conversation. These states determine how the agent 
behaves. 
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An agent conversation consists of an initiator side and a responder side. Both sides of 
the conversation move through various states in harmony as the conversation develops. 
Eventually, both sides of the conversation will end up in its respective end state and the 
conversation will be completed. It is the state transition diagram that allows one to visualize the 
various states a conversation goes through and records the events that cause the conversation to 
move from state to state. 
Figure 1 illustrates one side of a conversation and Figure 2 illustrates the complimentary 










Figure 1: Initiator Half of Conversation Sendlnfo (DeLoach, 1999) 
Sendlnfo: responder wail 
sendf informat w) 
,,    [invaliddata]"failuretransmission 
send( information) | validation 
do: validate(information) 
a^ [valiiMat Ncknowfedge 
Figure 2: Responder Half of Conversation Sendlnfo (DeLoach, 1999) 
The beginning state in a conversation is the "start" state. It is signified by a solid circle. 
The final state in a conversation is the "end" state and is signified by a solid circle with a ring 
drawn around it. Each intermediary state is drawn as an unfilled rounded edge rectangle. The 
state's name is inside the rectangle.  Arrows between states indicate transitions between those 
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states and the direction of the transition. Labels on the arrows indicate the events and actions that 
take place to cause a transition from one state to another. The transition labels follow Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) notation. The labels are formatted as follows: 
event-name(argument  list)[guard condition]/action-expression^send- 
clause 
The label may contain some or all of this information. Each state may have more than 
one entry point and exit point, but all exit points must be deterministic. Referring to Figure 4, 
there are three states in the initiator side of the Sendlnfo conversation. They are the start, wait 
and end states. The transition from the start state to the wait state sends a 
send (information) message. The information is a parameter that is passed with the 
message. The transition from the wait state back to the wait state takes place when a 
failure-transmission message is received while in the wait state. This transition receives 
a failure-transmission message then sends a send (information) message before 
transitioning back to the wait state. Finally, the transition from the wait state to the end state 
takes place when an acknowledge message is received while in the wait state. No messages 
are sent during this transition and this side of the conversation ends. 
2.3 Verifying Agent Conversations Using Formal Methods 
Multi-agent software systems are difficult to build. Part of the research community 
believes multi-agent systems should be open ended and conversations between various agents 
should be dynamic and flexible (Sycara, 1998). Another part of the community believes agent 
conversations should be predetermined and structured so that all possible variants of a 
conversation are reproducible and verifiable (Harel, 1987). Some researchers have undertaken an 
effort to develop formal approaches to assist the software developer in the analysis and design of 
multi-agent systems (Holzmann, 1987). Fortunately, automated tool support is also available to 
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assist with formal methods. Many tools have been developed that analyze concurrent systems. 
These tools can also be used to verify agent conversations. 
One of the simplest ways to verify agent conversations is with a technique called 
reachability analysis (Cleaveland, 1993). Automated tools are excellent for this technique. The 
first step in using an automated tool is to model the conversation using a language accepted by 
the tool. Some of the most popular languages to choose from are Communicating Sequential 
Processes (CSP) (Hoare, 1985), Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS) (Milner, 1989), and 
Process Meta Language (Promela) (Holzmann, 1997). After modeling the proposed system using 
the required input language, the user may provide logical formulae describing undesirable states 
that the system should never reach. Given such formulae and the system description, the tool 
explores every possible state the conversation may reach during execution and checks to see if an 
undesirable state is reachable. If so, the automated tool reports a description of the execution 
sequence leading to the offending state. Using this approach, automated tools can find many 
undesirable conditions such as deadlock and critical section violations. 
Reachability analysis falls under a more general type of verification called model 
checking (Cleaveland, 1993). Using this approach, an analyst describes a conversation using a 
design language, and then specifies properties the conversation should have as logical formulae. 
These formulae define behaviors the conversation should, or should not have as it executes and 
contains temporal operators enabling one to describe how a conversation behaves as time passes. 
Using such a temporal logic one can state properties such as the following: 
• The variable p will eventually become true 
• It is mandated that after p becomes true, q will become true and remain true 
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In the next section, an overview of communication system properties and the various 
methods of describing system properties are provided. 
2.4 Properties of Communication Systems 
Properties of communication systems in general fall under two broad categories: generic 
and user-specified properties.    Generic properties that are applicable to all communication 
systems   are   deadlock,   infinite   overtaking,   and   livelock.      User-specified  properties   of 
communication systems can be further broken down into safety and liveness properties. 
2.4.1 Generic Properties of Communication Systems 
2.4.1.1 Deadlock 
A deadlock is a situation in which two computer programs sharing the same resource 
effectively prevent each other from accessing the resource, resulting in both programs blocked. 
When computer operating systems run only one program at a time all of the resources of the 
system are available to this one program. However, when operating systems run multiple 
programs at once, interleaving them with each other, programs can request resources 
dynamically.    This can lead to the problem of deadlock. Here is a very simple example: 
Program one requests resource A and receives it. 
Program two requests resource B and receives it. 
Program one requests resource B and waits for program two to 
release it. 
Program two requests resource A and waits for program one to 
release it. 
Now neither program can proceed until the other program releases a resource. The 
operating system has a dilemma and cannot know what action to take. At this point, the only 
alternative is to kill one of the programs. Learning how to handle deadlock situations has had a 




In agent conversations, deadlock can occur when both sides of a conversation wait to 
receive a message that never arrives. This dilemma can happen many ways. The message could 
be lost, an incorrect message could be sent, or the message could not be sent at all. 
2.4.1.2 Infinite Overtaking 
To demonstrate the concept of infinite overtaking, recall the infamous dining 
philosophers' example as portrayed by C.A.R. Hoare in his book, Communicating Sequential 
Processes (Hoare, 1985). A round table has been prepared with five chairs containing five 
philosophers and a bowl of pasta in the middle of the table. Each of the philosophers has a fork 
on the table between him and the other philosophers; thus, there are five forks in all. Before a 
philosopher can eat, he must have a fork in each hand. This means that not all five philosophers 
can eat at one time. Suppose a seated philosopher has a greedy left neighbor and a rather slow 
left arm. Before he can pick up his left fork, his left neighbor rushes in, sits down, quickly picks 
up his left and right forks, and has his fill of pasta. Eventually he puts down both forks and gets 
up to leave. Then the left neighbor gets hungry again, sits down, and quickly grabs both of his 
forks before his right neighbor has an opportunity to pick up the fork they share. Since the 
philosopher with the bottomless stomach can repeat this cycle forever, the seated philosopher to 
his right may starve to death. 
One such agent-based scenario is where an agent requests information from a pool of 
information brokers. If one of the brokers happens to be extremely quick, the remaining brokers 
will never be able to answer any requests for information. The real loser in this scenario may be 




Livelock is a situation in which some critical stage of a task is unable to finish its 
processing. This is because the users of this particular task continuously create more work for 
the task to do after the critical stage of the task has provided the requested service for them but 
before the given task can clear its request queue. Livelock differs from deadlock in that the 
process is not blocked or waiting for anything but has a virtually infinite amount of work to do 
and can never catch up. An example of livelock is that of an interrupt driven operating system. If 
too many interrupts arrive at the operating system's kernel and then continue to bombard the 
kernel, the operating system will not be able to actually service any of the interrupt requests 
because it will spend all of its time processing the receiving of the interrupts. In other words, the 
operating system is so busy receiving interrupt requests it cannot service any of the requests. 
Agent conversations can also succumb to livelock. A broker agent could be inundated 
with requests for information to the point where he could never respond to all the requests 
because his time is spent processing the receipt of requests. 
2.4.2 User-defined Properties of Communication Systems 
It is easy to take a snapshot of a system and analyze its properties. However, often it is 
more desirable to know if eventually something will happen or conversely, that something will 
never happen. This type of system property can be described using temporal operators. Many 
properties of agent conversations can be expressed with temporal operators. For example, we 
might want to know that if message A is sent to a recipient, eventually a reply will be received. 
This property can be stated as "it is always the case that eventually we receive a reply from the 
recipient." This is commonly known as message sequence verification. 
12 
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Temporal logic is simply an extension of propositional logic. The difference between the 
two is that temporal logic has special operators that allow for time. Amir Pnueli defines a 
temporal operator called the henceforth operator [ ] (Manna, 1992). An example of how this 
operator would be used is [ ] p, read henceforth p or always p. Therefore, [ ] p holds at position q 
if and only if p holds at position q and all of the following positions from now until 
eternity. 
Pnueli also defines a temporal operator called the eventually operator <>. An example of 
this operator is <>p, read as eventually p. Therefore, <>p holds at position j if and only if 
p becomes true at some position q where q>=j. 
The combination of temporal operators can be used to form many types of user-defined 
properties. The next few sections accent the types of conversation properties that can be 
expressed with temporal operators. 
2.4.2.1 Safety Properties 
Safety properties have the form "bad things will not happen." These properties are 
expressed by logical statements that the system state must satisfy at all times as well as pre and 
post conditions. Preconditions reflect the state of a program before the execution of a set of 
statements. Postconditions reflect the state of a program after the termination of a set of 
statements. 
2.4.2.1.1 Nontermination 
As an example of a user-defined safety property, consider the property of nontermination 
of a conversation. A conversation is nonterminating if it never enters an end state. This property 
can be expressed by the formula [ ] (-iterminal). 
13 
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2.4.2.1.2 Conditional Safety 
An example of a conditional safety formula is p-> [ ] q. In this case, whenever the state 
formula p becomes true, the state formula q must be true forevermore. Applied to an agent 
conversation, if a sender of a message receives a reply acknowledging receipt of said message, 
the sender's conversation will terminate and stay terminated. 
2.4.2.2 Liveness Properties 
Liveness properties have the form "good things will happen." Examples of liveness 
properties include termination or non-termination requirements in programs. 
2.4.2.2.1 Guarantee Properties 
Guarantee formulas state that some property will eventually happen. They guarantee that 
the event happens at least once, but make no promises of the event repeating. In fact, it doesn't 
matter if the event happens again, as long as it happens once. Therefore, guarantee formulas are 
used to ensure events happen at least once in the lifetime of a program execution, such as 
program termination. 
An example of this property applied to an agent conversation is <> end. This means that 
a conversation eventually enters the end state and terminates. This concept is also used to check 
for the existence of livelock. If a process or conversation does not end when it is designed to end, 
it is evidently caught in a livelock situation. 
2.4.2.3 Obligation Properties 
Sometimes a safety or liveness property alone does not sufficiently describe the desired 
state of the system or conversation. In this case, a combination of the two types of properties is 
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needed. An obligation formula is a formula of the form [] p   ||   <>q. As expected, this formula 
states that either p holds at all positions of a computation or q holds at some position. 
2.4.2.3.1 Response Properties 
An example of a response property is [ ] <>p. This property states that p can be satisfied 
infinitely many times in the computation, but at least once. Applied to an agent conversation, a 
response property would be used in the following scenario. A sender sends a message to a 
receiver and waits a specified amount of time for an acknowledgment. If the acknowledgment 
doesn't come, the message is sent again until an acknowledgment finally arrives. 
2.4.2.3.2 Persistence Properties 
Persistence properties are specified as <> [ ] p. This property states that all positions from 
a certain point on in a computation or conversation will satisfy p. Persistence formulas are used 
to describe the eventual stabilization of some state or property of the system or conversation. 
These properties allow an unspecified and varying delay until the stabilization occurs, but 
mandate that after occurring, it must be continuously maintained. 
2.4.2.3.3 Reactivity Properties 
Reactivity formulas are formed by a disjunction of a response formula and a persistence 
formula [ ] <>p   | |   <> [ ] q. This formula states that either p occurs infinitely many times or q 
occurs all but a finite number of times. 
2.4.3 Summary 
Many properties of systems can be verified with an automated verification tool, including 
temporal properties. A system designer must first model the proposed system and then he can 
simply define a system's behavior over time using temporal formulas. Automated tools can then 
15 
AFIT/GCS/ENG/OOM-12 
search the entire state space of the system to verify that general communication faults are not 
present and the described temporal properties hold true. 
2.5 Formal Languages and Automated Verification Tools 
This section provides an overview of three formal languages and three automated tools 
that are used to model and verify communication systems. They are Communicating Sequential 
Processes (CSP), Failures-Divergence Refinement 2 (FDR2), Calculus of Communicating 
Systems (CCS), Concurrency WorkBench (CWB), Process Meta Language (Promela) and Spin. 
Together, these languages and tools help an analyst verify that a system design will perform 
correctly. 
2.5.1 Communicating Sequential Processes 
C.A.R. Hoare first described CSP in a 1978 paper.  The basic ideas from his original 
paper were later adjusted and updated to produce a more flexible version of CSP (Hoare, 1985). 
As an example of CSP syntax, consider a clock that never does anything but tick. The keyword 
CLOCK describes the process and the keyword tick describes an event within the process (Hoare, 
1985). 
CLOCK  =   (tick->CLOCK) 
This simple example illustrates a CSP recursive model. CSP allows the description of 
systems as a group of individual processes, which communicate with each other over channels. 
(Hoare eventually determined that component processes did not have to be sequential, but the 
name was already established.) 
The modularization of CSP fits the structure of many problems very well. With CSP, an 
analyst models a system as a network of processes that communicate via messages along 
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unidirectional channels.   The transfer of messages between processes is synchronous, which 
means the sending or receiving process stalls until the system transfers the message. 
2.5.2 Failures-Divergence Refinement 2 
FDR2 is a tool that allows an analyst to define a finite-state based system and then verify 
the system is correctly designed (Lowe, 1997). It is based on the theory of Communicating 
Sequential Processes (CSP). The theory of refinement in CSP enables a system engineer to 
describe a wide range of correctness conditions, including freedom from deadlock and livelock as 
well as safety and liveness properties. 
Early versions of FDR could analyze systems with 107 states in a modest amount of time 
on standard workstations. The most current version of FDR2 incorporates hierarchical 
abstraction and compression routines that allow systems with very large state-spaces, (72*1024) for 
example, to be analyzed in minutes. 
FDR2 is simple to use and has extensive debugging facilities to support system 
development. If an error is detected during a verification process, FDR2 provides a description of 
the system state at the point where FDR2 detected the error, as well as the sequence of events that 
lead to the error. 
2.5.3 Calculus of Communicating Systems 
Robin Milner's work on CCS developed from an experiment in 1972. While working in 
the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at Stanford, he tried to apply ideas learned while working 
on sequential programming to a concurrent programming language. However, he found this was 
not possible (Milner, 1989). One of the problems he ran into was because of an incorrect 
assumption. One way to decipher a sequential program is as a mathematical function over system 
memory states.  If one knows the function corresponding to a particular program and the start 
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state, then one can figure out the end state. The only problem with this approach is that it 
assumes the program has exclusive control of the memory. If something interferes with the 
memory, then unpredictable states result. 
Two programs that have the same function can behave very differently when subjected to 
the same interference. Milner gives a simple example where two lines of a computer program 
have exactly the same effect, in the absence of interference: 
1)   x:=l 2)x:=0;   x:=x+l 
However, suppose some other process at some unpredictable moment performs x:=l. 
Then the total effect of fragment 1 plus the other processes execution is different from that of 
fragment 2 plus the offending process. In fragment 2, the value of x could be either 1 or 2, 
depending on the given situation. This simple example demonstrates that in the presence of 
concurrency or interference, programs do not have exclusive rights to memory, but instead 
programs interact with each other while sharing memory. 
This experiment prompted Milner to find an alternate theory in which communication 
was the focus. In 1977 Milner learned of Hoare's work with CSP and realized that he and Hoare 
both recognized that a new concept was needed, the concept of indivisible interaction. Milner 
also started a concept called observation equivalence of processes. The theory of observation 
equivalence was recorded in "A Calculus of Communicating Systems", published in 1980 
(Milner, 1989). 
An example of CCS follows. 
C = infx).C'(x) 
C(x)   = out(x).C 
Milner points out that agent names like C or C can take parameters (Milner, 1989). In this case 
c takes one parameter but C takes none. The prefix "in(x) ." means a handshake takes place 
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where a value is received at port in and the variable x becomes equal to that value. 
in(x) .c (x) is an agent expression. It is required to perform the aforementioned handshake 
and then continue according to the definition of c'. The statement, out (x) . c, is also an agent 
expression. This agent's behavior is to place the value of x at port out and then continue 
according to the definition of c. 
2.5.4 The Concurrency WorkBench 
The Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench is an automated tool designed to manipulate and 
analyze concurrent systems (Stevens, 1998). The CWB enables its users to check their systems in 
many different ways. The definition language for CWB is CCS. With CWB, users can perform 
tests on specified systems such as reachability analysis and model checking. Users can also 
verify systems defined with temporal properties. CWB allows users to interactively simulate the 
behavior of an agent. This is accomplished by guiding the agent through its state space in a 
controlled fashion. 
2.5.5 Process Meta Language 
Promela differs from the languages discussed thus far in that it is a modeling language. 
As such, it is used to abstractly model communication protocols (Holzmann, 1997). Promela is 
perfectly suited for modeling agent conversations. Conversations are modeled as processes, 
conversation paths are modeled as channels, and variables that may be used in a conversation can 
be defined and tested. All statements are either executable or blocked, waiting to execute. 
Statements may be blocked if the statement is a conditional statement and the condition is false. 
In this case, the statement blocks until the condition becomes true. This property provides a 
means of synchronizing communications between processes by causing one process (a responder) 
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to wait on a message sent by another process (the initiator) while in a specific state.   The 
initiating process may also block while waiting on a reply from the responding process. 
Promela processes are defined with the word proctype. The following is an example of 
a proctype declaration. 
proctype  ProcessAO 
{ 
byte newVariable,- 
newVariable = 3 
} 
The name of this process is Process A and curly braces encapsulate the body of the 
declaration. Promela declarations can contain zero or many statements as well as local variable 
declarations.     The proctype declaration above contains one local  variable declaration, 
newVariable,  and  a  single  statement:   an  assignment  of the  value  3  to  the  variable 
newVariable.  In Promela, semicolons and arrows '->' separate statements. Therefore, in the 
above example no semicolon is needed after the last statement. The arrow is sometimes used as a 
way to indicate a causal relation between two statements. For example: 
byte newVariable = 2; 
proctype ProcessAO 
{ 




newVariable = newVariable  -  1 
} 
This example declares two processes, ProcessA and ProcessB.   Since the variable 
declaration newVariable is outside all processes, it is a global variable initialized to the value of 
two.    ProcessA contains two statements and ProcessB contains a single statement that 
decrements newVariable by one. An assignment is always executable, so ProcessB does not 
block and executes immediately. However, if a condition is not true, then the process is blocked 
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until  the  condition  becomes   true.     Therefore,   ProcessA  is  blocked  at  the  condition 
(newVariable==l) until the value of newVariable is equal to one. 
A proctype is only a process. It cannot run on its own. Something must start the 
process running. Spin uses a process called init to start other processes running. The init 
process is similar to a main procedure in Java programs. An init process declaration for the 
previous example would look as follows: 
init 
{ 
run  ProcessA(); 
run ProcessBO 
} 
In this example, the keyword run kicks off the two processes. Parameters can also be 
passed    when    invoking    processes    with    the    run    statement.        For    example,    run 
ProcessA (parameter!.). 
2.5.6 Spin 
Spin is an automated verification tool from Bell Labs that operates on the Promela 
modeling language. It is designed to verify software instead of hardware and has been used to 
verify many distributed systems and communication protocols (Holzmann, 1997). Spin will 
detect deadlock, livelock, assertion violations, and many other communication centric errors. 
Spin supports both synchronous and asynchronous communications by using channels to 
pass messages and varying the channel buffer size. If the channel buffer size is zero, then the 
communications are synchronous. If the channel buffer size is greater than zero, the 
communications are asynchronous. 
With Spin, many types of simulations are possible. A user may choose to perform a 
random simulation, or a guided simulation. A user may also choose to perform a verification that 
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exhaustively searches the entire state space of the model for errors. If Spin finds an error, the 
user can then perform a guided simulation that will reproduce the condition that caused the error. 
This technique is very helpful for finding and pinpointing errors in models. 
Spin can also catch correctness violations by checking for the existence of execution 
sequences that abort because an assert statement has been violated. An assert statement 
mandates that the asserted statement must remain true at all times. 
To verify a system model is correct, Spin uses three specialized Promela states and 
analyzes temporal formulas like those mentioned in previous sections. End states, progress 
states, and accept states are used along with never claims to verify models. These features will 
be covered in the next few sections. 
2.5.6.1 End states 
If a process does not complete its processing before the system terminates, Spin flags the 
process as being in an invalid end-state. This is a common technique used to detect deadlock. If 
a system designer designs a process so that it can stop without completing, then the process has to 
be marked with an end label. 
2.5.6.2 Progress states 
Spin uses progress states to detect the presence of infinite overtaking by keeping track 
of how often Spin executes a process labeled with a progress label. Spin will produce an error 
if it cannot execute a progress labeled process an infinite number of times. In other words, any 
process labeled with a progress label cannot remain blocked indefinitely from executing. 
An example of the use of a progress label is: 
proctype ProcessA(){ 
do 




The presence of the progress label requires the statement chanAtoB?v be executed 
infinitely many times. The only way this statement can be executed infinitely many times is if the 
statement chanAtoB !p can also be executed infinitely many times. 
2.5.6.3 Accept states 
The accept state is treated exactly the opposite as the progress state and is used to 
detect correctness of temporal property specifications. If Spin enters an accept state an infinite 
number of times, an error is produced. A user can label a "trap" state with an accept label and 
then Spin will check an infinite number of times if it can enter the trap state. If it can, then the 
condition leading to the trap state has been met and Spin has succeeded in catching the error 
condition. 
The following process demonstrates the use of an accept state. This process should 
eventually block at the beginning of the statement chanAtoBlp. If this process did not 
eventually block at this statement, then the process would run forever, and this would cause Spin 
to produce an error. The accept state would be visited infinitely often because the process 
would run forever, thus creating the error condition. 
proctype ProcessAO 
{ do 
:: chanAtoBlp -> accept: chanAtoB?v 
od 
} 
2.5.6.4 Never claims 
Spin uses never claims to define temporal formulas. These never claims are then used 
to check for undesirable or illegal state properties. Spin will produce an error if it finds any 
execution sequence that ends where the never claim has terminated by reaching the closing 
brace of its body.   As detailed in an earlier section, Spin will produce an error if there is an 
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execution sequence that visits infinitely often an accept state. Combining never claims and 
accept states, Spin can detect illegal infinite (cyclic) behavior by labeling a block of statements 
in a never claim with an accept label, creating an accept state, and then checking the selected 
statements an infinite number of times to see if Spin can enter the blocked accept state. 
2.5.6.5 Example claim 
If p and q are two boolean variables and the temporal claim is made that "along every 
computation, each system state in which p is true is eventually followed by the case when q is 





::   p -> break 




::    !q 
od 
} 
The first do loop terminates only when the variable p becomes true. According to our 
claim, the variable q should eventually become true. The second do loop (hence the never 
claim) will never terminate and cannot be broken out of. The never claim continuously checks 
the system state to see if q has become true. The never claim either eventually blocks because 
the variable q becomes true (which is the desired behavior) and the accept state cannot be 
entered, or Spin continuously enters the accept state because q is not true. If Spin can enter the 
accept state without ever being blocked, this is an error. Because Spin guarantees an exhaustive 
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search of the system state space, if there is any violation of our claim, Spin will detect it. If the 
never claim ends in the accept state, then an error has been detected. 
2.5.7 Summary 
Each of the formal languages covered can accurately portray a system and describe the 
system's behavior. The difference in the languages is the ease of use and understandability of the 
language, as well as the automated tools that support the language. Promela is a modeling 
language, and thus resembles a programming language rather than a formal language. This 
feature makes Promela easier to understand for most computer scientists. 
All three of the automated verification tools covered here can verify a system is deadlock 
free. They can also verify safety properties and liveliness properties. The basic difference in the 
systems lies in their input language. Therefore, the choice of which system to use depends 





Currently, the only way to formally verify the agent conversations designed in a multi- 
agent environment with an automated tool is for someone to translate, by hand, the design into a 
formal language and then run the verifier on this formal representation. Most people believe 
formal methods are too difficult to understand and use in this manner (Hinchey, 1999). The 
challenge then is to automatically generate the formal representation of a conversation from the 
design in the multi-agent development environment. Then, using an automated tool, verify this 
representation is free from undesirable communication properties such as deadlock. 
As stated in Section 1.3, the goal of this research is to develop a formal methodology and 
technique to verify that the communication protocols defined in a multi-agent environment are 
valid. This chapter outlines steps that can be used to apply this research to any multi-agent 
development environment. Section 3.2 explains how an agent conversation is modeled with a 
state transition diagram. Section 3.3 explains how the state transition diagram can then be 
converted into a set of state tables. The task of creating a formal representation of the state 
transition diagram from the state table is described in Section 3.4. The process of verifying the 
formal representation with an automated tool is detailed in Section 3.5. Figure 3 is a top-level 
view of the overall process. 
3.2 Modeling Agent Conversations with State Transition Diagrams 
According to Roger Pressman, 
The state transition diagram indicates how the system behaves as a 
consequence of external events. To accomplish this, the state transition 
diagram represents the various modes of behavior (called states) of the 
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Representation With An 
Automated Tool 
Figure 3: Top Level View of Methodology 
An agent conversation consists of an initiator side and a responder side. Both sides of 
the conversation move through various states by sending and receiving messages. Eventually, 
both sides of the conversation should end up in their respective "end" states and the conversation 
will be completed. It is the state transition diagram that allows us to visualize the various states a 
conversation goes through and it records the events that cause the conversation to move from 
state to state. 
As shown in Chapter 2, Figure 4 illustrates one side of a conversation and Figure 5 
illustrates the complimentary side of the conversation.   The two sides make up one complete 
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conversation, which may be part of a much larger system (or set) of conversations.   The 
conversation is shown here again for easy reference. 
The responder side of the Sendlnfo conversation has four states and the transitions 
complement the transitions in the initiator side of the conversation. The next step in the modeling 






Figure 4: Initiator Half of Conversation Sendlnfo 
Sendlnfo: responder 






Figure 5: Responder Half of Conversation Sendlnfo 
3.3 Converting a State Transition Diagram to a State Table 
A state table is a textual representation of a graphical state transition diagram. The 
advantage a state table has over a state transition diagram is that it can be parsed easily. This 
feature is critical when Promela source code has to be generated. 
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The state table is built from the transition labels on the transition arrows of a state 
transition diagram. The state table is simply an ordering of all the transitions possible in a state 
transition diagram. The state table is ordered so all transitions pertaining to a particular state are 
together. The state table also must begin with the Start state and end with the End state. Normal 
state tables do not have these requirements, but they are necessary here for automatically building 
Promela source code. The format of the state table should mirror that of the transition labels in a 
state transition diagram. However, each entry in the state table needs to know the state the 
transition is coming from and the state it is going to, even if it is the same state. One solution to 
this problem is to add to the beginning of the state table entry the current state of the transition 
while adding to the end of the entry the next state the transition will enter. The different fields of 
the state table entry should be separated by a semicolon or some other character for ease in 
parsing the table later. Figure 6 illustrates a state table using the Sendlnfo conversation in Figures 
4 and 5. In this state table, a name is given to both halves of the conversation and this name 
inserted at the beginning of each line.  This naming convention will be used to create Promela 












Figure 6: State Table of Conversation Sendlnfo 
Each line of the state table contains the following information: process name (consisting 
of the conversation name and the participant's name), current state, received message, guard 
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condition, transmitted message, and next state.  Each entry in the state table must be unique to 
prevent duplication of Promela code. 
The state table provides a textual representation of the state transition diagram. The state 
table is now used to build a formal representation of the state transition diagram by converting the 
state table into Promela source code. The following section demonstrates how Promela is used to 
model an agent's conversation. 
3.4 Creating Promela Code from a State Table 
Modeling a conversation with Promela is not as difficult as one would think. However, 
creating the Promela code using as input a state table requires a method of parsing the state table 
and automatically creating the source code. In this section, the Sendlnfo conversation is modeled. 
Each Promela statement will be described as it is used. 
3.4.1 Message Type Declarations 
The first line of Promela code needed is the message type declarations. Promela has a 
type called mtype that allows a programmer to declare constants without assigning values to the 
constants. The declaration looks like this: 
mtype={failureTransmission,send,invalidData,validData,acknowledge}; 
Promela does not allow hyphens in declarations, thus the word failureTransmission 
instead of failure-transmission.   These values are found by searching through the state 
table and creating a vector of messages by examining the received message, guard condition, and 
transmit message fields. 
3.4.2 Channel Declarations 
The next declaration required is the channel the messages will use. Promela allows for 
synchronous or asynchronous transmissions. The channel declaration looks like this. 
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chan busl = [1] of {mtype}; 
This declaration states that a variable busl is of the type chan, and it can hold one 
message in its buffer. Only messages of type mtype can be sent on this channel. If the [ 1 ] was 
replaced with [ 0 ], then no messages could be buffered and all messages would have to be taken 
off the channel (received) before another message could be placed on the channel (transmitted). 
The channel declarations are determined by the number of conversations in the state table. If 
only one conversation is in the state table, then only one channel declaration must be made. 
However, if for instance three conversations are contained in the state table, then three channels 
must be used to prevent messages from interfering with each other. 
3.4.3 Process Declarations (Proctypes) 
The next step is to create processes that emulate each side of the conversation. Promela 
has a construct called a proctype that models each half of a conversation. Each process 
contains all of the states for one side of the conversation. The processes are designed to begin in 
the startstate and end in the endstate, while moving from states only if explicitly directed 
to do so. Figure 7 shows the proctype declaration for the responder side of the Sendlnfo 
conversation, while Figure 8 shows the initiator side of the same conversation. 
The keyword proctype declares a procedure. The state labels all end with a colon. The 
do. . od loops trap the flow of control inside their respective states. Two ways to exit a do. . od 
loop is with a goto statement or a break statement. The goto transfers control to another state 
while the break just exits the loop and falls through into the next state. For obvious reasons, it is 
unacceptable to fall into another state unless explicitly directed to do so. An exclamation point 
(!) after the channel variable busl signifies the message send has been placed on the channel. 
The arrow (->) is a statement separator and serves as an implication symbol.  If the statement 
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before the arrow is executed then the statement after the arrow is also executed. The semicolon 
(;) is also a statement separator but carries no implications. Finally, a question mark (?) after the 
channel variable busl signifies the message following the question mark is taken off of the 































:: busl?failureTransmission-> buslsend; goto 
progresswaitState 







Figure 8: Process Sendlnfolnitiator 
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3.4.4 Process Declarations (Init) 
Now that the processes representing the two halves of the conversation have been 
modeled, a process needs to be created that will start the conversation processes running. This 
process is called an init process. Figure 9 shows what the init process looks like for the 
Sendlnfo conversation. 
init 






Figure 9: Init Process for Sendlnfo Conversation 
The keyword atomic mandates all statements enclosed within its brackets will be 
executed without interruption by external processes. The keyword run starts the processes 
running and these processes are run in parallel. Figure 10 shows the complete Promela code for 
the Sendlnfo conversation. 
3.4.5 Verifying Message Sequences 
Sequence diagrams (Rational, 1997) are beneficial for real-time specifications and for 
complex scenarios. They show the explicit sequence of messages between agents and can exist in 
a generic form (all the possible sequences of messages) or an instance form (one actual sequence 
consistent with the generic form). Sequence diagrams show the big picture in the grand scheme 
of agent conversations. 
Listing desired messages between conversations in a specified order creates a message 
sequence. Sequence diagrams represent interactions among agents within a system to achieve a 
desired operation or result. A graphical representation of a message sequence is called a message 
sequence chart (Rational, 1997). Figure 11 shows a valid message sequence chart encompassing 
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two conversations (Sendlnfo and CollectData) between three agents (Commander, Mission Cntrl, 
and Data Collection). Not all of the messages that could be sent in these conversations need be 
included in the message sequence chart. 
mtype =   {failureTransmission,   send,   invalidData,   validData, 
acknowledge}; 









:: invalidData -> bus!failureTransmission; goto 
progresswaitState 



















:: busl?failureTransmission -> buslsend; goto 
progresswaitState 







{  atomic 
{ run SendlnfoResponder();run Sendlnfolnitiator() }} 
Figure 10: Complete Promela Code for Sendlnfo Conversation 
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Figure 11: Message Sequence Chart 
Message sequences are converted to a table similar to a state table as shown in Figure 12. 
The format of the message sequence table is Conversation Name; Conversation From 
Participant; Conversation To Participant; Message. When checking for a message sequence the 
sequence is defined in a Promela never claim and checked for its existence. A never claim is a 
special type of process that is optional and, if it exists, is used to detect undesirable behavior. If a 
message sequence defined in a never claim is found, Spin will generate an error. Of course, this 
is not really an error because we want to verify the sequence exists and the error condition has 
confirmed the sequence does indeed exist.    Figure 13 is the never claim for the message 
sequence table of Figure 12. 
Sendlnfo;Responder;Initiator;send 
CoUectData; Initiator ;Responder;collectData 
CoUectData; Responder; Initiator; return 
Sendlnfo;Initiator;Responder;send 
Figure 12: Message Sequence Table 
A key difference in the modeling of a message sequence and a conversation is the way 
message events are detected. In a conversation, the channel that messages are transmitted on is 
constantly monitored and messages must be placed on the channel and taken off the channel in a 




Many messages may be placed on the channel and taken off the channel before a desired 
message is detected as part of a particular sequence. Modeling sequences in this fashion provides 































Figure 13: Never Claim for Message Sequence Verification 
The completed Promela source code is now saved and will be used as input for the 




3.5 Verifying a Communication Protocol Using Spin 
There are three steps in running Spin: 1) Compile the source code, 2) Generate the 
analyzer files, and 3) Execute the analyzer. 
3.5.1 Compile the Source Code 
Spin is invoked by passing it the file name of our Promela code. This command looks as 
follows: 
redir  -o error  spin -a verify 
The redir  -o  error portion of the above command uses a utility provided by the C 
compiler that will redirect the output of the spin command to a file called error.   The -a 
parameter generates a protocol specific analyzer.  Spin's output is a set of C files, named pan 
(protocol analyzer). 
3.5.2 Generate the Analyzer Files 
The second step in running Spin is to compile the pan files with a C compiler to produce 
the analyzer (pan. exe), which is then executed to perform an analysis of the protocol. The 
command required to compile the pan files is as follows: 
gcc -DEBITSTATE -DSAFETY -o pan pan.c 
The -o parameter guarantees an exhaustive state space search for errors. The - 
DEBITSTATE parameter uses a memory efficient bit state space method to prevent exhausting the 
memory available on some machines. The -DSAFETY parameter decreases the overhead 
associated with liveness properties when only checking for safety properties. In this case, the 
check is for deadlock, which is a safety property. 
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If checking for non-progress states, a different command must be used. It is not possible 
for Spin to check for both deadlocks and non-progress states at the same time.  The command 
needed is as follows: 
gcc -DNP -DBITSTATE -o pan2 pan.c 
In this command, the -DNP parameter directs Spin to check for non-progress cycles 
instead of deadlocks. 
There is one more command that can be used to analyze a conversation. If a never 
claim is used in the model, then the -DSAFETY parameter cannot be invoked. This is because a 
never claim can incorporate more than just safety properties. It is possible to check for a 
message sequence with Promela/Spin using a never claim. Figure 13 is a message sequence 
trace that contains the message sequence of Figure 11. The command that must be used when a 
conversation is modeled this way is as follows: 
gcc -DEBITSTATE -o pan pan.c 
Notice that the command is just like the command to check for deadlocks, but without the 
-DSAFETY parameter. 
3.5.3 Execute the Analyzer 
The third step in running Spin is to execute the analyzer. The pan files are compiled into 
an executable file called pan.exe. The pan.exe file is the analyzer that when executed 
analyzes the compiled protocol. The command to execute the analyzer is as follows: 
redir  -o output.txt pan.exe 
This is the command to use when checking for deadlocks. When running the pan. exe 
file, a trace file (verify. trail) is created if an error is found in the protocol. This trace file 
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can then be examined by Spin to pinpoint the location of the error. The command to generate a 
sequence trace based on the trail file is as follows: 
redir -o trace.txt spin -t -c verify 
proc 0 = :init: 
proc 1 = SendlnfoResponder 
proc 2 = Sendlnfolnitiator 
proc 3 = CollectDatalnitiator 
proc 4 = CollectBtaResponder 
proc 5 = CollectDatalnitiator 
proc 6 = CollectDataResponder 
proc 7 = SendRawIntelResponder 
proc 8 = SendRawIntellnitiator 
proc 9 = SendlnfoResponder 
proc 10 = Sendlnfolnitiator 
q\p  0123456789  10 
1    Sendlnfo!send 
1    SendInfo?send 
1 Sendlnfo! failureTransmission 
1    SendInfo?failureTransmission 
1     Sendlnfo!send 
2     SendRawIntel!send 
1     Sendlnfo?send 
1     Sendlnfo!failureTransmission 
1    SendInfo?failureTransmission 
2     SendRawIntel?send 
1   .........      Sendlnfo!send 
1      Sendlnfo?send 
1     Sendlnfo!failureTransmission 
2     SendRawIntel!failureTransmission 
1     SendInfo?failureTransmission 
1     Sendlnfo!sfen 
1      SendInfo?send 
2      SendRawIntel?failureTransmission 
1      Sendlnfo!failureTransmission 
1 Sendffm?failureTransmission 
1   .........   .  Sendlnfo!send 
1     SendInfo?send 
1     Sendlnfo!acknowledge 
1     Selldfo? acknowledge 
2     SendRawIntel!send 
2      SendRawIntel?send 
2     SendRawIntel!failureTransmission 
3      CollectDatalcollectData 
2 SendRawIntel?failureTransmission 
2     SendRawIntel!send 
2 SendRawIntel?send 
2     SendRawIntel!failureTransmission 
3     CollectData?collectData 
2 SendRawIntel?failureTransmission 
2     SendRawIntel!send 
2     SendRawIntel?send 
3 ColelctData! col lectionFai lure 
2     SendRawIntel!failureTransmission 
2     SendRawIntel?failureTransmission 
2 SendRawIntel! send 
2    SendRawIntel?send 
3     CollectData?collectionFailure 
2     SendRawIntel[failureTransmission 
2     SendRawIntel?failureTransmission 
2    SendRawIntel!send 
Figure 13: Message Trace of Message Sequence Verification 
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The -t parameter directs Spin to follow the simulation trail in the tail file 
(verify, trail). The -c parameter tells Spin to put the simulation output in columnated order. 
If checking for non-progress errors, the command to execute the analyzer is as follows: 
redir -o newpan2.txt pan2.exe -1 
In this command, the -1 parameter tells the analyzer to find non-progress cycles. If 
checking for a message sequence with a never claim that contains an accept state, then a different 
command must be used. The command is as follows: 
redir  -o newpan.txt pan.exe  -a 
In this command, the -a parameter tells Spin to find acceptance cycles, which would 
have been declared inside the never claim. Note that a never claim can be declared without an 
acceptance state.   However, Spin appears to find an error faster if an acceptance state is 
used. 
3.6 Interpreting Results 
The only thing left to do is display the output. txt file for any error messages, and if 
there were any errors, the trace. txt file for the detailed trace. The output will list any errors as 
well as the quantity of errors. Figure 14 shows an example of the Spin output with no errors. 
The messages generated by Spin show that a full statespace search was performed for 
assertion violations and invalid end states. The search reached a depth of 12 levels and found 
no errors. This conversation model contained three processes, and none of them had states that 
were unreachable during the simulations. 
If errors were detected during the verification process, text files are created that contain 
the detailed error information. If a deadlock condition occurs, Spin generates an invalid end-state 
error for each state that is deadlocked. If a state is never entered into, then Spin generates a non- 
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progress state error message. Finally, if a message sequence is not detected and an error 
generated, then the message sequence does not exist and a true error is found. Figure 15 shows 
the output generated by Spin when a deadlock condition is inserted into the Sendlnfo conversation 
by changing one of the transmitted messages to a received message. 
(Spin Version 3.2.4 — 10 January 1999) 
+ Partial Order Reduction 
Full statespace search for: 
never-claim - (none specified) 
assertion violations   + 
acceptance  cycles    - (not selected) 
invalid endstates + 
State-vector 28 byte, depth reached 12, errors: 0 
12 states, stored 
1 states, matched 
13 transitions (= stored+matched) 
1 atomic steps 
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved) 
(max size 2A18 states) 
1.493      memory usage (Mbyte) 
unreached in proctype SendlnfoResponder 
(0 of 24 states) 
unreached in proctype Sendlnfolnitiator 
(0 of 18 states) 
unreached in proctype :init: 
(0 of 4 states) 
Figure 14: Spin Output of Sendlnfo Conversation 
In this output, only one error is detected. However, it was an invalid end-state caused by 
a deadlocked state in the conversation. Spin generated a file called verify. trail that can be 
used to recreate the message trace that caused the deadlock condition. This is very useful in 
troubleshooting the condition that caused the error. 
Figure 16 is the output generated by Spin when checking for non-progress states. Non- 
progress states are detected if any state labeled with the keyword progress is not entered into. 
This output did not detect any errors, but did note that two states in the procedure 
SendlnfoResponder and two states in Sendlnfolnitiator were not reached.   This error 
41 
AHT/GCS/ENG/OOM-12 
was caused because the conversation was deadlocked, and thus the conversation could not 
proceed to these states and complete the conversation. 
pan: invalid endstate (at depth 5) 
pan: wrote verify.trail 
(Spin Version 3.2.4 — 10 January 1999) 
Warning: Search not completed 
+ Partial Order Reduction 
Full statespace search for: 
never-claim - (none specified) 
assertion violations + 
cycle checks        - (disabled by -DSAFETY) 
invalid endstates + 
State-vector 24 byte, depth reached 8, errors: 1 
9 states, stored 
1 states, matched 
10 transitions (= stored+matched) 
1 atomic steps 
hash conflicts: 0 (resolved) 
(max size 2A18 states) 
1.493   memory usage (Mbyte) 
Figure 15: Spin Output of Detected Deadlock 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter described the methodology used to verify agent conversations in a multi- 
agent system. The process began by modeling the conversations using a state transition diagram. 
The state transition diagram was then converted into a state table where it was parsed into the 
Promela modeling language. Finally, Spin was run against the Promela code and deadlock and 
non-progress errors where checked for. Also demonstrated was how Promela and Spin could be 
used to verify message sequences by declaring a never claim and checking for the existence of 
the desired message sequence. 
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(Spin Version 3.2.4 -- 10 January 1999) 
+ Partial Order Reduction 
Bit statespace search for: 
never-claim + 
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim) 
non-progress cycles + (fairness disabled) 
invalid endstates - (disabled by never-claim) 
State-vector 32 byte, depth reached 16, errors: 0 
10 states, stored 
2 states, matched 
12 transitions (= stored+matched) 
2 atomic steps 
hash factor: 381300 (expected coverage: >= 99.9% on avg.) 
(max size 2A22 states) 
3.066   memory usage (Mbyte) 
unreached in proctype SendlnfoResponder 
line 21, state 21, "goto" 
line 24, state 24, "-end-" 
(2 of 24 states) 
unreached in proctype Sendlnfolnitiator 
line 38, state 15, "goto" 
line 41, state 18, "-end-" 
(2 of 18 states) 
unreached in proctype :init: 
(0 of 4 states) 





Chapter 3 described how this research could be applied to a generic multi-agent 
development environment. This chapter outlines the steps taken to implement the generic 
methodology in AFTT's agentTool multi-agent development environment. Section 4.2 provides 
an overview of how multiple conversations are verified using agentTool. Section 4.3 steps 
through three examples of how to verify multiple conversations. The first example will not 
contain any errors. The second example will contain a deadlock condition and will contain non- 
progress states (states that are not entered into). The third example will demonstrate how a 
message sequence is verified. Finally, Section 4.4 gives an analysis of the types of errors that are 
detected and reported by agentTool, and perhaps more importantly, those errors that are not 
detected and reported. 
4.2 Verification Overview 
In agentTool, a conversation takes place between two agents. Therefore, the first step in 
verifying a conversation is to create two agents and establish a conversation between them. After 
the conversation is established, the two sides of the conversation must be defined. The agentTool 
environment automatically creates a start state and an end state for each side of the 
conversation. All the conversation designer must do is fill in the required states and transitions 
for each side of the conversation. 
The conversation definition process is repeated until all necessary conversations are 
completed. The verification process is invoked by clicking on the Command pull down menu and 
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choosing the Verify Conversations option. Figure 17 is a Data Flow Diagram (DFD) of the 
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Figure 17: Verification Data Flow Diagram 
The next section provides details of each process listed in Figure 17. After the 
conversations have been verified, feedback is provided to the user by means of a text window that 
contains useful and meaningful messages while highlighting states and transitions on the state 
transition diagrams where errors have been detected. As often happens with source code and 
compilers, a single error may generate many error indicators. For this reason, many states and 
transitions may be highlighted when only one or two is actually in error. 
4.3 System Design 
The conversation verification subsystem of agentTool was implemented using Java, text 
files, and batch commands. Each step of Figure 17 is detailed below to demonstrate how the step 
was actually implemented. 
4.3.1 Define Conversations 
Conversations are designed in agentTool using state transition diagrams. The diagrams 
are built using graphical tools. Conversation states and transitions between states have properties 
associated with them that are defined by the system designer. This part of the agentTool research 
effort is documented in Wood's Thesis (Wood, 2000). 
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4.3.2 Build Conversation State Table 
The state transition diagram must be converted into a state table before automatically 
generating Promela source code. Wood's thesis addresses how the values for each state transition 
are derived and a state table created. Each entry in the state table contains tiieconversation name, 
the participant, the current state, the received message (if it exists), the guard condition (if it 
exists), the transmitted message (if it exists), and the next state. Every transition in the state 
transition diagram is mapped to an entry in the state table. The state table is actually a vector of 
transitions that can be analyzed to build the Promela source code. 
It is important the state table be ordered on conversation states so that all of a 
conversation's information is contiguous (sequential without interruption). Therefore, once a 
state table has been created it is sorted so all of a given state's transitions are together in the table. 
4.3.3 Build Promela Code 
Chapter 3 explains the general process of automatically building Promela source code 
from a state table. The process takes five steps: 1) declare mtype variables, 2) declare 
channels, 3) build proctypes, 4) build init procedure, and 5) build never claim. 
The Promela source code is saved in a text file. Before declarations can be made, the text 
file must be created and opened. The name of the text file is simply Goverif y. 
4.3.3.1 Declare mtype Variables 
Received messages, guard conditions, and transmitted messages all must be declared as 
mtype variables. To find these variables, the state table vector is searched one transition at a 
time and appropriate variable names added to a new mtype vector. Every received message, 
guard condition, and transmitted message is compared to the variables in the mtype vector. If the 
variable already exists in the vector, it is passed over. However, if it does not exist in the vector, 
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it is added. After one compete pass through the state table, the mtype vector contains a list of the 
mtype variables with no duplicates. 
The mtype declarations are the first entries in the Promela source code. The text string 
mtype = { is printed along with the contents of the mtype vector delimited by commas. After 
the mtype vector has been printed, the declaration is completed by printing}; and starting a new 
line of the source code. 
4.3.3.2 Declare Channels 
Channels are the communication lines between two halves of a conversation. Therefore, 
a channel exists for every conversation in the state table. The channel declarations are made by 
first printing the text string chan.   Then the state table is searched sequentially and every 
conversation name printed, comma delimited.  The declaration is completed by printing =   [1] 
of  {mtype}; and starting a new line of source code. 
4.3.3.3 Build Proctypes 
A proctype declaration must be made for each side of a conversation. The state table is 
ordered so that all the transitions for a conversation's participant are together. The first 
transitions are those from the start state and the last entry for each participant in the state table is 
the end state transition. 
The state table vector is read sequentially and only one pass through the vector is 
required to create all the proctypes. For each proctype declaration, the text proctype is 
printed followed by the conversation name concatenated with the participant's name. This 
technique creates a unique proctype name for each side of every conversation. The initial line 
of the declaration is finished with the text () and an opening brace printed on a new line. Each 
state in the proctype is declared by printing the text progress followed by the state name and 
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finished with a colon. The next line of the state declaration contains the textdo, which begins a 
do loop. Every line of text within the do loop contains the text :: followed by the proper 
formatting of the transition. After all the transitions for a given state are printed, thedo loop is 
terminated by printing the text od;. After all the states have been printed, the proctype 
declaration is completed by printing a closing brace. This process repeats until allproctypes 
have been generated. 
4.3.3.4 Build init Procedure 
The init procedure is declared by printing the text init followed by an opening brace 
on a new line. The key word atomic is then printed followed by another opening brace on a new 
line. The state table is then read sequentially and a line printed for each conversation half (two 
entries per conversation). Each line contains the keyword run followed by the conversation 
name concatenated with the participant name and ended with parentheses. Each run statement 
must be separated by a semicolon. After all the run statements are written, two closing braces, 
each on its own line, must be printed. 
The init procedure is the last part of the Promela source code that is created unless 
checking for a valid message sequence. Then, in addition to the above procedures, a never 
claim must be declared. 
4.3.3.5 Build Never Claim 
A never claim follows the init procedure. It is declared by first printing the keyword 
never followed by an opening brace on a new line. The never claim is built by reading a 
message sequence table. There must be a state in the never claim for each entry in the message 
sequence table. The states are declared by first labeling the state with the text State and 
appending to it an integer beginning with 0 and incrementing the integer by 1 for every new state 
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created. Each state label must end with a colon. Each state is made up of ado loop that contains 
two entries. 
The first entry is the channel name the message is expected to traverse appended with a 
question mark to signify receiving a message on that channel. Appended to the channel name and 
question mark is the message name enclosed in brackets. This method of detecting a message on 
a channel allows unwanted messages to pass until the desired message is detected. An arrow is 
appended to the bracketed message and a goto statement that directs the conversation to the 
following state if the correct message is detected. 
The second entry is a skip statement that keeps the never claim in the current state until 
the desired message is detected. The state declaration is finished by ending the do loop with the 
textod;. 
After all the states have been printed, an accept state must be declared. The accept 
state traps the never claim until all the conversations have terminated. The accept state is 
created by printing the keyword accept: followed by the keyword skip on a separate line. The 
never claim is then completed by printing a closing brace. The completed Promela source code 
is now saved in the text file verify for use with Spin. 
4.3.4 Check for Valid Conversations 
When Spin is started, the Promela source code is first checked for syntactical errors. 
Syntactical errors such as invalid characters in variable names will cause Spin to generate an error 
file that contains the error messages. If after running Spin the error file contains messages, they 
are displayed in the message window for the user to analyze. The command to run Spin against 
the Promela source code created above is: 
Spin.exe  -a  verify 
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The -a parameter tells Spin to create an analyzer specific to the protocols specified in the 
file verify. Syntactical errors must be corrected before the conversations can be verified. If no 
error messages are reported, Spin creates the appropriate files that can be used to generate an 
executable analyzer. 
4.3.5 Check for Deadlock 
Once the analyzer files have been created, an executable analyzer file must be created. 
This is accomplished by compiling one of the newly generated files (pan. c) into an executable 
file (pan. exe). The command required is: 
gcc.exe -DEBITSTATE -DSAFETY -o pan pan.c 
The gcc command invokes a standard C compiler. The -DEBITSTATE parameter uses a 
memory efficient bit state space method to prevent exhausting the memory available on some 
machines. The -DSAFETY parameter decreases the overhead associated with liveness properties 
when only checking for safety properties. The -o parameter guarantees an exhaustive state space 
search for errors. 
Now pan. exe can be executed and the protocol specific files analyzed. The command 
required for this is simply: 
pan.exe 
Spin displays the results of the analysis by default to the computer screen. However, the 
output can be redirected to a text file by using a C utility, redir. The command to accomplish 
this task is: 
redir -o output.txt pan.exe 
The -o parameter is used by the redir command and states the output should be 
directed to the file output. txt. 
50 
AFIT/GCS/ENG/OOM-12 
4.3.6 Check for Non-Progress 
The check for non-progress is similar to that for deadlock. However, special parameters 
must be used because Spin cannot check for both deadlock and non-progress with the same 
command. The command required is: 
gcc.exe  -DNP  -DEBITSTATE -o pan pan.c 
In this command, the -DNP parameter directs Spin to check for non-progress cycles 
instead of deadlocks. The newly created pan.exe must be executed to actually perform the 
analysis, but the procedure is the same as in Section 4.3.5. 
4.3.7 Check Valid Sequence 
If checking for a valid message sequence, a slight modification to the deadlock check is 
required. Since a never claim is declared when checking for valid message sequences, the check 
cannot only be for safety properties. The check must now also include checking for liveness 
properties associated with the never claim. The command required is: 
gcc  -DEBITSTATE  -o  pan  pan.c 
The command is exactly like the check for deadlocks except the -DSAFETY parameter is 
missing and cannot be used. The newly created pan. exe file must be executed to analyze the 
protocol specific files and generate the appropriate output. 
4.3.8 Provide Feedback 
Feedback is provided to the system designer through a text based message window and 
through graphical highlighting of the state transition diagram. When executing thepan. exe file, 
the output is redirected to a text file. The contents of the text file are then copied into the 
message window enabling the system designer to see the results of the analysis. Sometimes the 
Spin output is difficult to interpret for novice users, so the output is automatically parsed and 
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states and transitions are highlighted to assist the user in locating errors. During the verification 
process, a vector containing all known deadlock transitions and non-progress states is created and 
used to highlight the state transition diagrams. 
4.4 Examples 
4.4.1 Conversation without Error 
The first step in verifying conversations is to build the conversations.  Figure 18 is an 











Figure 18: Conversation between Agents 
The only properties of the conversation a user can define from this screen is the name of 
the conversation (Sendlnfo) and the direction of the conversation (who is the initiator and who is 
the responder). By clicking on the conversation line, two tabs appear. One tab is to define the 
state diagram for the initiator and one tab for the responder. 
By clicking on one of the two tabs, a new window appears that automatically provides a 
start and an end state for the conversation designer. It is assumed every conversation has a 
start and an end state. In this window, designers add states and transitions to create a complete 
state transition diagram. Figure 19 is an image of the initiator side of the Sendlnfo conversation. 
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The complementary side of this state transition diagram is the responder side of the Sendlnfo 
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Figure 19: Initiator Side of Sendlnfo Conversation 
The Sendlnfo conversation is now completely specified and is ready to be verified. The 
verification process is invoked by clicking on the Command pull down menu and choosing 
Verify Conversations. A state table is created from the states and transitions of the state 
transition diagram and this state table is used to create the Promela Code. Figure 21 is the 
Promela Code created from this conversation. 
The automated tool Spin is now invoked to check the syntax of the Promela code. If the 
code is syntactically correct, Spin generates an analyzer to determine if protocol errors exist in the 
conversation. The first check is for deadlocks. Spin determines if deadlocks exist by seeing if 
either side of the conversation terminates while not having reached its end state. Spin calls this 
kind of error an invalid end-state error. If the conversation is deadlocked, a message is displayed 
in a text window that tells the user exactly where the deadlock occurred.   The offending state 
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transition is also highlighted on the graphical state transition diagram. The highlighting can only 
be removed by re-verifying the conversation. 
Figure 20: Responder Side of Sendlnfo Conversation 
After the deadlock check is performed, the conversation is checked for livelock by 
checking for states that are never entered. Spin calls this type of error a non-progress error 
because the conversation has not made progress in these particular states. Again, if an error 
condition exists, a message is displayed in the text window telling the user exactly where the non- 
progress states are and the non-progress states are highlighted on the state transition diagrams. 
They remain highlighted until the conversation is re-verified. If a deadlock condition is detected, 
a trace file is created by Spin that allows a simulation be run that pinpoints the location of the 
error. This message trace is also displayed in the text window to help the user to find the source 
of the conversation errors. Figure 22 is the output messages displayed for the user when 
verifying the Sendlnfo conversation. 
Since there were no errors in this conversation, no error messages were displayed and no 
states or transitions were highlighted. The next example will implement a conversation that has a 
deadlock condition in it. 
54 
AFIT/GCS/ENG/OOM-12 
mtype = {send, acknowledge, failureTransmission, invalidData, 
validData }; 









:: SendInfo?acknowledge -> goto progressEndState 



















:: invalidData -> Sendlnfo!failureTransmission; goto 
progresswait 

















Figure 21: Promela Code of Sendlnfo Conversation 
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!!!!!!!!!! OUTPUT OF SPIN ANALYSIS !!!!!!!!!! 
Analysis Completed... Evaluating Analysis... 
********** OUTPUT FROM DEADLOCK CHECK ********** 
CONVERSATION IS NOT DEADLOCKED!!! 
********** OUTPUT FROM PROGRESS CHECK ********** 
CONVERSATION DOES NOT HAVE UNUSED STATES!!! 
********** OUTPUT FROM SIMULATED RUN ********** 
No trace available 
Figure 22: Output From Sendlnfo Verification Run 
4.4.2 Conversation with Error 
The conversations shown thus far are error free. However, agentTool provides excellent 
user feedback when errors are detected. In order to demonstrate agentTool's error detecting and 
reporting capability, a new conversation must be created between two agents. Figure 23 shows 







Figure 23: Two Conversations with Three Agents 
The CollectData conversation must now be described.   As before, there is an initiator 
side and a responder side to the conversation.    Figure 24 shows the initiator side of the 
conversation while Figure 25 shows the responder side of the conversation. 
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Figure 24: Initiator Side of CollectData Conversation 
The initiator side of the CollectData conversation has an error in it. The transition from 
the logFailure state that is labeled acknowledge is incorrect. As drawn, the transition is 
waiting to receive an acknowledge message before transitioning to the end state. The transition 
should be drawn so that it automatically sends an acknowledge message when in the wait state 
and then immediately transitions to the end state. This incorrectly labeled transition will cause 
the CollectData conversation to be deadlocked. Figure 26 is the Promela code for the collect data 
conversation. 
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Figure 25: Responder Side of CollectData Conversation 
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mtype - ( validData, invalidData, failureTransmission, acknowledgoollectData, return, 
collectionFailure, sensorFailure, movanä'ailure, collectionComplete ); 









:: CollectData?return-> goto progressvalidateData 




:: invalidData-> CollectData!failureTransmission; goto progresswaiting 



















sensorFalure -> CollectData!collectionFailure; goto progresswait 
movementFailure-> CollectData!collectionFailure; goto progresswait 




:: CollectData?acknowledge> goto progressEndState 























Figure 26: Promela Source Code for CollectData Conversation 
When the user verifies these two conversations, a message window appears that gives the 
status of the verification.   As soon as the error is detected, the color of the text in the window 
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changes to red. Since a deadlock condition was detected, a trace file is created and the message 
sequence trace is displayed in the message window. Figure 27 shows the sequence trace 
generated by the deadlock condition. 
The two transitions that are deadlocked are also specified in the message window as well 
as highlighted on the graphical state transition diagram. Figure 28 shows the highlighted 
transition for one side of the deadlocked conversation. 
This method of feedback provides an excellent means for a user to identify problems in 
conversations. Appendix A shows the entire contents of the message window after verifying 
these two conversations. Figure 29 shows the deadlock messages that are displayed in the 
message window. 
proc 0 = :init: 
proc 1 = Sendlnfolnitiator 
proc 2 = SendlnfoResponder 
proc 3 = CollectDatalnitiator 
proc 4 = CollectDataResponder 
q\p   0   1   2   3   4 
1 CollectDatalcollectData 
1   .   .   .   .   CollectData?collectData 
1 CollectDatalcollectionFailure 
1 CollectData?collectionFailure 
2 .   Sendlnfolsend 
2 .   .   SendInfo?send 
2 .   .   Sendlnfo!acknowledge 
2 .   SendInfo?acknowledge 
spin: trail ends after 16 steps 
final state: 
iprocesses: 5 
16:  proc  4 (CollectDataResponder) line  92 "verify" (state 27) 
16:  proc  3 (CollectDatalnitiator) line  65 "verify" (state 24) 
16:  proc  2 (SendlnfoResponder) line  46 "verify" (state 24) 
<valid endstate> 
16:  proc  1 (Sendlnfolnitiator) line  25 "verify" (state 22) 
<valid endstate> 
16:  proc   0  (:init:)  line  114  "verify"  (state  6)  <valid 
endstate> 
5 processes created 
Figure 27: Sequence Trace of CollectData Conversation 
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Figure 28: Highlighted Transition from CollectData Conversation 
DEADLOCK CONDITION EXISTS IN THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION: 
Conversation Name = CollectData 
Participant Name = Responder 
Current State = wait 
State Transition = acknowledge 
DEADLOCK CONDITION EXISTS IN THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION: 
Conversation Name = CollectData 
Participant Name = Initiator 
Current State = logFailure 
State Transition = acknowledge 
Figure 29: Deadlock Messages from Message Window 
4.4.3 Message Sequence Verification 
Once conversations are defined and verified, specific message sequences that traverse the 
conversations can also be verified. Currently agentTool does not have the capability to 
graphically represent message sequence charts. However, message sequence charts can be 
represented via message sequence tables. Message sequence tables are very similar to state tables 
except the state information is not required. All that is needed is theconversation the message is 
a part of, the initiator and the responder of the message, and of course the message. Figure 30 is 
a message sequence chart that can be verified using the above two conversations. 
Figure 31 shows a message sequence table for the message sequence chart of Figure 30. 
Before the message sequence can be verified, the conversations must be valid.   Therefore, the 
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CollectData conversation must be corrected by changing the received acknowledge message 
from the logFailure state to a transmitted acknowledge message from thelogFailure state. 









Figure 31: Message Sequence Table for Sendlnfo and CollectData Conversations 
As described in Section 3.4.5, a message sequence is verified by making a never claim 
that states the desired sequence can never occur. Spin then tries to detect the message sequence, 
and if it finds the sequence a never claim violation is raised. This is a very efficient way to find 
a message sequence using a state space analyzer. Appendix B shows the message window output 
after searching for the message sequence in Figure 31. If the message sequence is valid, a trace 
of the messages is provided to show how the sequence was found. 
If the trace is not valid, Spin will not be able to find the never claim. Depending on the 
machine's capabilities, verifying a message sequence does not exist may take quite a bit of time. 
Figure 32 is a message sequence table that contains an invalid message sequence.   The send 





Figure 32: Invalid Message Sequence Table 
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The results of the invalid message sequence verification are displayed in the message 
window and are referenced in Figure 33. 
PLEASE STAND BY... TESTING MESSAGE SEQUENCE... 
!!!!!!!!!! OUTPUT OF SPIN ANALYSIS !!!!!!!!!! 
Analysis Completed... Evaluating Analysis... 
********** OUTPUT FROM MESSAGE SEQUENCE CHECK ********** 
MESSAGE SEQUENCE IS INVALID!!! 
********** SEQUENCE TRACE IS AS FOLLOWS ********** 
Message Sequence Invalid... - No trace available 
********** TESTING COMPLETED ********** 
Figure 33: Invalid Message Sequence Output 
Since the message sequence is invalid, no trace exists. 
4.5 Analysis 
Spin can check for many types of errors (Holzmann, 1997).   However, agentTool does 
not currently provide the capability to check for all of them.  This section will discuss what can 
and cannot currently be detected. 
4.5.1 Errors Detected 
4.5.1.1 Conversation Deadlocks 
Conversation deadlocks are detected if there are no intervening factors such as hardware 
failures or timing problems. This is accomplished by performing an exhaustive state space search 
for deadlock conditions. 
Figure 34 shows a conversation with a deadlocked condition. The transitions causing the 
deadlock are highlighted. The transition on the initiator side of the conversation is incorrect in 
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that it should be labeled as transmitting an acknowledge message instead of receiving an 
acknowledge message. 
Figure 34: Conversation with Deadlock Condition Detected 
4.5.1.2 Unused States 
Unused states are detected by checking for non-progress loops. If a state is not used, it is 
not entered into and a non-progress error is generated. 
Figure 35 shows a conversation with an unused state. The transition leading to the 
unused state (State2) is never enabled. The transition is waiting for a received message (c) that 
never is sent by the other side of the conversation. Therefore, the state can never be entered into 
and is highlighted to assist the system designer. 
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Figure 35: Conversation with Unused State Detected 
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4.5.1.3 Unused Messages 
Unused messages are detected when they are not taken off the message channel, thereby 
leaving messages on the buffer. Since messages placed on the channel must be matched by a 
receiving process that takes them off the buffer, any unused messages will generate deadlock 
errors. This might not actually be a deadlock condition, but the error raised will generate enough 
information for the user to identify the source of the problem. 
Figure 36 shows a conversation with an unused message. The transition from State 1 has 
a transmitted message (b) that is not received by the other half of the conversation, thus causing a 
blockage. 
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Figure 36: Conversation with Unused Message Detected 
4.5.1.4 Mislabeled Transitions 
Mislabeled transitions are detected when Spin is first run. If the syntax is incorrect, Spin 
cannot compile the Promela code into the executable analyzer. Feedback is provided via a 
message window when a syntax error occurs. Figure 37 shows the error messages generated 
when an invalid character (?) is used in a transition. 
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4.5.1.5 Inability to Create Required Sequences 
Inability to create required sequences is detected using never claims. The desired 
message sequence is modeled using a never claim, and if Spin does not generate a never claim 
violation, the message sequence does not exist. Section 4.4.3 describes how an invalid message 
sequence is detected and Figure 33 shows the messages after detecting the message sequence 
does not exist. 
spin: line  1 "verify", Error: syntax error saw 'operator: ?' 
spin: line  9 "verify", Error: syntax error saw 'operator: ?' 
spin: line  25 "verify", Error: undeclared variable: a  saw     ';' 
near 'goto' 
spin: line  29 "verify", Error: undeclared variable: b  saw     *; ' 
near 'goto' 
spin: line  41 "verify", Error: proctype Convllnitiator not found 
1 mtype = { ?a, a, b }; 
2 
3 chan Convl = [0] of {mtype}; 
4 




9 : :   ?a   ->  Convl!a;   goto  progressStatel 
10 od; 
Figure 37: Conversation Error Messages from Mislabeled Transition 
4.5.2 Undetectable Errors 
There are some communication errors that agentTool and Spin cannot currently detect. 
These errors would be difficult for any automated system to detect; however, they are mentioned 
here for completeness. There are plans to implement a syntax checker in agentTool that will 




4.5.2.1 Timing Errors 
Timing errors caused by system properties cannot be detected by Spin. The 
conversations may be valid, but if a system property causes a conversation to pause indefinitely, 
the complementary conversation is deadlocked until the system property allows the conversation 
to continue. In this scenario, the conversations are valid and have been verified. Nevertheless, 
the overall system will not perform correctly. 
Figure 38 shows a conversation that is valid and verified. However, one of the transitions 
(initiator side from start state) contains a guard condition that, if it never becomes true, will 
prevent the conversation from completing. 
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Figure 38: Timing Error Not Detected in Conversation 
4.5.2.2 Floating States 
Floating states (states with no transitions) cannot be detected by agentTool and Spin 
because they are not passed from agentTool via a state table to the verifier. If a state does not 
have any transitions, it is not included in the state table and it is non-existent as far as the verifier 
is concerned. Figure 39 shows a state diagram created with agentTool that contains a floating 
state. The conversation is valid and the floating state is ignored. 
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4.5.2.3 Hardware Failures 
Hardware failures that cause infinite conversation loops cannot be detected by agentTool 
and Spin. The conversations are valid and have been verified, but if a sensor or other piece of 
hardware continues to send the same message in the context of a valid conversation, the 
conversation can become livelocked and the conversation cannot progress. 
Figure 39: Floating State in Conversation 
4.5.2.4 Guard Conditions 
Guard conditions whose logic is specified incorrectly cannot be detected by agentTool 
and Spin. If a guard condition is specified as part of a conversation, agentTool uses a figurative 
representation of the guard condition to verify the conversation. If the guard condition consists of 
an algebraic formula that is written incorrectly, Spin will never know. Figure 40 shows a 
conversation with a guard condition specified incorrectly. The logic is wrong (A>5 && A<5). 
4.5.2.5 Interacting Conversations Deadlock 
Interacting conversations deadlock that results when two conversations are contending 
for a common resource cannot be detected by agentTool and Spin. Even though the 
conversations are valid, they can deadlock waiting for the same resource. Figure 41 shows a 
conversation where both sides are waiting on the same file, but neither can have access to it. 
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Figure 40: Incorrectly Specified Guard Condition in Conversation 
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Figure 41: Interacting Conversations Deadlock 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated how agent conversations can be verified in agentTool 
using Promela and Spin. The input is via graphical state transition diagrams while the feedback 
to the user is both graphical and textual. Many critical communication centric errors are detected 
by agentTool and Spin. However, not all errors are detected by the automated tool so the final 
burden rests on the user to ensure the newly created multi-agent system is tested sufficiently. 
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V. Conclusions and Future Work 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters of this thesis demonstrated how the conversations in a multi-agent 
system could be automatically verified. This chapter summarizes the conclusions from the 
previous chapters, and suggests areas of future work that will enhance and extend this research. 
5.2 Conclusions 
The previous chapters presented a methodology for automatically verifying multi-agent 
conversations and a prototype implementing this methodology. The following sections present 
conclusions obtained from this research. 
5.2.1 Automatic Verification of Multi-agent Conversations 
The automatic verification of conversations is a five step process that takes a graphical 
representation of a conversation via a state transition diagram, converts the state transition 
diagram to a state table, and creates a formal representation from the state table which can be 
formally verified. Creation of the state transition diagrams and state tables are straightforward. 
Creation of the formal representation requires in-depth knowledge of the formal language used. 
Spin is an excellent modeling language because it is designed to represent communication 
protocols. Other formal languages may be used, such as Communicating Sequential Processes or 
Calculus of Communicating Systems, but these languages are very difficult to understand and 
adapt to agent conversations. 
This methodology is appropriate for verifying conversations in a closed agent system, 
where agents communicate through known and predictable state-based conversations. This 
methodology can also verify message sequences exist given a set of conversations. Figure 42 is a 
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state transition diagram used to graphically define an agent's conversation. Figure 43 is a 
message sequence chart used to illustrate the possible sequence of messages involving potentially 
many agent conversations. 
The following is a summary of the types of errors detected through this methodology: 
• Conversation deadlocks are detected if there are no intervening factors such as 
hardware failures or timing problems. 
• Unused states are detected by checking for non-progress loops. 
• Unused messages are detected when they are not taken off the message channel, 
thereby leaving messages on the message buffer. 
• Mislabeled transitions are detected when Spin is first run by executing a syntax 
checker provided by Spin. 
• The inability to create required sequences is detected using never claims. 
SrffSi;ä{»a*t* «•»■* fC«wCnw<< 




Figure 42: State Transition Diagram 
A few errors cannot be detected at this time using this methodology. The following is a 
brief list summarizing undetectable errors: 




• Floating states (states with no transitions) cannot be detected because they are not 
passed from the graphical interface to the verifier. 
• Hardware failures that cause infinite loops cannot be detected. 
• Guard conditions incorrectly specified cannot be detected because the verifier 
does not evaluate guard conditions. 
• Interacting conversations deadlock that results when two conversations are 
contending for a common resource cannot be detected. 
Commander MCElement DataCollection 
sen d(in formation) 
co llectDa ta(senso r,loci tio n) 
return(data) 
Figure 43: Message Sequence Chart 
5.2.2 Implementation with agentTool 
With agentTool, agent conversations are modeled using state transition diagrams. These 
state transition diagrams are automatically converted into Promela source code and verified with 
Spin. Feedback is provided to the system designer through text windows and graphical 
highlighting of error conditions in the original state transition diagrams. Although agentTool is 
still in development, it is a valuable tool for assisting the multi-agent system developer in 
building complex systems. 
5.3 Future Work 
AgentTool verification can be made more complete by adding a syntax checker to catch 
typographical and logical errors before attempting to verify conversations. Since agents designed 
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with agentTool are state-based, their designs should also be able to be verified using Promela and 
Spin. 
5.3.1 Development of a Syntax Checker 
Programming language compilers such as C and JAVA contain a syntax checker to 
ensure the programs written in their language are specified correctly. The syntax of agent and 
conversation specifications made with agentTool should also be evaluated by a checker to ensure 
they are written correctly. A syntax checker for agentTool would ensure 1) invalid characters 
(such as !?@#) are not used in conversation specifications, 2) guard conditions are logically 
correct, and 3) "do" actions required in conversation states or transitions are implemented in the 
agent's behavior. A syntax checker would also perform such tasks as ensuring at least one 
message (transmit, receive, or both) is associated with a transition. 
The Object Constraint Language (OCL), developed by Integrated Business Engineering 
Language, IBM, is part of the Unified Modeling Language from version 1.1 on (Rational, 1997). 
OCL is based on standard set theory and is used to specify invariants on classes and types in the 
class model, to describe pre- and post conditions on operations and methods, and to describe 
guards. OCL can be used to write expressions that evaluate to true or false, thus making it a 
good choice for defining relational algebra formulas. 
IBM has written a parser for OCL that can perform some basic syntax checking. This 
parser may be incorporated into the agentTool architecture and used to verify specifications 
written in OCL are correct. Portions of agent and conversation specifications in agentTool are 
written in OCL and should be verifiable with an OCL parser. 
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5.3.2 Verification of an Agent's State-based Behavior 
Since an agent's behavior can be defined using state transition diagrams (Robinson, 
2000), a system of agents can be verified by simulating the response agents have when receiving 
and sending messages through conversations with other agents. Figure 44 shows an agent's state 
based interior. 
Figure 44: Agent State Based Interior (Robinson, 2000) 
This would be similar to the research performed in this thesis and many of the same techniques 
reapplied. 
5.4 Summary 
This research addresses a critical need in the development of multi-agent systems, 
automatic verification. Automatic verification brings together the skills of computer scientists 
and mathematicians resulting in software that is more dependable and robust than previously 
attainable with traditional software development tools. Software engineers no longer have to 
hope their agent conversations will work as expected.   Automatic verification, once thought 
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APPENDIX A: MESSAGES FOR ERROR 
CONVERSATION 
PLEASE STAND BY... TESTING CONVERSATIONS... 
!!!!!!!!!! OUTPUT OF SPIN ANALYSIS !!!!!!!!!! 
Analysis Completed... Evaluating Analysis... 
********** OUTPUT FROM DEADLOCK CHECK ********** 
CONVERSATION IS DEADLOCKED!!! 
►,** OUTPUT FROM PROGRESS CHECK ********** 
CONVERSATION DOES NOT HAVE UNUSED STATES!!! 
**** OUTPUT FROM SIMULATED RUN ********** 
******* 
****** i 
proc 0 = :init: 
proc 1 = Sendlnfolnitiator 
proc 2 = SendlnfoResponder 
proc 3 = CollectDatalnitiator 
proc 4 = CollectDataResponder 





2 .  Sendlnfoisend 
2   .   .   SendInfo?send 
2  .   .  Sendlnfo!acknowledge 
2  .  Sendlnfo?acknowledge 
spin: trail ends after 16 steps 
final state: 
#processes: 5 
queue 2 (Sendlnfo): 
queue 1 (CollectData) : 
proc 4 (CollectDataResponder) line  92 "verify" (state 27) 
proc 3 (CollectDatalnitiator) line 65 "verify" (state 24) 
proc  2 (SendlnfoResponder) line  46 "verify" (state 24) <valid 
endstate> 
proc  1 (Sendlnfolnitiator) line  25 "verify" (state 22) <valid 
endstate> 






5 processes created 
********** DETAILED DEADLOCK INFORMATION ********** 
DEADLOCK CONDITION EXISTS IN THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION: 
Conversation Name = CollectData 
Participant Name = Responder 
Current State = wait 
State Transition = acknowledge 
DEADLOCK CONDITION EXISTS IN THE FOLLOWING CONVERSATION: 
Conversation Name = CollectData 
Participant Name = Initiator 
Current State = logFailure 
State Transition = acknowledge 
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********** TESTING COMPLETED * ********* 
Appendix B: Messages from Message Sequence 
Verification 
PLEASE STAND BY... TESTING MESSAGE SEQUENCE... 
!!!!!!!!!! OUTPUT OF SPIN ANALYSIS !!!!!!!!!! 
Analysis Completed... Evaluating Analysis... 
********** OUTPUT FROM MESSAGE SEQUENCE CHECK ********** 
MESSAGE SEQUENCE IS VALID!!! 














































0 = :init: 
1 = Sendlnfolnitiator 
2 = SendlnfoResponder 
3 = CollectDatalnitiator 
4 = CollectDataResponder 
5 = CollectDataResponder 
6 =» CollectDatalnitiator 
7 = Sendlnfolnitiator 







































spin: trail ends after 98 steps 
final state: 
♦processes: 10 
98 proc 8 
98 proc 7 
98 proc 6 
98 proc 5 
98 proc 4 
98 proc 3 
98 proc 2 
98 proc 1 
98 proc 0 
98 proc - 
10 i processes CI 
queue 1 (Sendlnfo): [send] 
queue 2 (CollectData): 
(SendlnfoResponder) line  15 





(SendlnfoResponder) line   9 
(Sendlnfolnitiator) line  34 
(:init:) line 110 "verify" ( 
(:never:) line 136 "verify" 
created 
"verify" (state 10) 
"verify" (state 11) 
56 "verify" (state 15) 
88 "verify" (state 28) 
83 "verify" (state 23) 
60 "verify" (state 24) 
"verify" (state 3) 
"verify" (state 11) 
state 10) <valid endstate> 
(state 26) <valid endstate> 
********** TESTING COMPLETED ********** 
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